Monday, 26 September 2016

Good books - September '16

Economics reading has been a bit thin on the ground recently, so instead let me pass on some third party recommendations. Diane Coyle at The Enlightened Economist got asked to recommend "some general reading for someone about to start a masters in public policy" and came up with this reading list. It's excellent: I've read four of them (Reinventing the Bazaar, Who Gets What and Why, What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets, and Economics Rules), and they were all very good, so I reckon you can trust the rest of the list as well.

And on the strength of this fine review by Deirdre McCloskey in Prospect magazine, I've pre-ordered my copy of economic historian Joel Mokyr's latest, A Culture of Growth: The Origins of the Modern Economy. Out on November 8, the hardback was only $40.71 (postage included) from The Book Depository in the UK. Mokyr's earlier book, The enlightened economy : Britain and the Industrial Revolution, 1700-1850, is also very good, if you'd like an update on where modern thinking has got to on the genesis and progress of the Industrial Revolution in the UK. If you're an economics student in New Zealand and you're interested (as you should be) in economic history, you're going to have to take this DIY route since, apart from a new course AUT is bringing out, there's virtually nothing offered on the economics syllabi anywhere (as I documented here).

Politics: I enjoyed Michael McManus's Edward Heath: A Singular Life. It's not a conventional biography - it started life as an intended collection of tributes and anecdotes from people who knew Heath but morphed as the material accumulated and McManus decided to make something bigger out of it - but it is still fascinating. Towards the end (p366) McManus summarises Heath as a "decent, shy, sometimes frustrated, often difficult, rarely charming, wantonly brusque, proud public servant who always believed in fairness and who loved his country".

People certainly remember the brusqueness and the rudeness - for a politician, he had a remarkably low EQ, and whatever lay behind his odd personality is still not obvious - and he became an even more awkward cuss when he was rolled by Margaret Thatcher. But they don't remember the better bits. Purely on merit, he got to the top of the socially hidebound Conservative Party, the first leader to be elected rather than anointed behind the scenes by the well-connected bigwigs: charmingly, he got nicknamed 'Grocer' by the toffs for his middle-class background. He had an admirable contempt for political spin and artifice, which was one reason he despised Harold Wilson (with, as history goes by, ever clearer justification). He had a life outside politics (talented musician, internationally competitive sailor). And he believed in attempting to reach agreement by principled negotiation in good faith - a fine ambition, and effective in piloting the UK into the European Community, but doomed to founder domestically in the dire industrial relations of the time.

The hardline union leaders of his day would have done better to meet him half-way, as they belatedly discovered from 1979 onwards, but they did for Heath, and the last of any legacy he might have claimed was swept away with Brexit. There are elements of tragedy to his story: they won't leave you feeling hugely sympathetic to the man - even the author, who worked for him, couldn't get that far - but you'll likely end up with a fairer overall view.

History: I was a Great War buff in any event, and didn't need the centenary of the Somme to have a go at the new books out commemorating it. I've finished Hugh Sebag-Montefiore's Somme: Into the Breach, and it's a good, solid introduction to what is still one of the bywords for wholesale slaughter. It also marked the New Zealand Division's blooding on the Western Front, at Flers in September 1916: you'll see the name on WW1 memorials all over New Zealand. Things would get worse again at Passchendaele in 1917.

By happenstance, Sebag-Montefiore uses the NZ Division as an example of the prevalence of venereal disease, of war crimes (killing prisoners) and of kangaroo court martials: he says they were equally prevalent in other units, but I can't say I was best pleased. Fortunately you'll get a better overall picture of our guys from Glyn Harper's Dark Journey: Passchendaele, the Somme and the New Zealand experience on the Western Front, where equally by happenstance I point you to how our chaps (and the Aussies) stopped the last great German offensive of the war in 1918 when General Gough's Fifth Army was running away. And if you want a classic example of Kiwi understatement, it's hard to beat the comment (reported on p467) of one infantryman, burying some of the dead after the battle for Bapaume in September 1918: "when there was only two of us left of our lot, I began to think: This is not too good".

Everyone should read a few of these front-line focussed books - it's still hard to go past Martin Middlebrook's 1971 classic The First Day on the Somme, or any of Lyn Macdonald's books, such as 1915: The Death of Innocence or They Called it Passchendaele - but at some point you'll inevitably start to think higher level thoughts about overall strategy and the meaning of it all. There are many thousands of choices, but one good entry point is J P Harris's relatively recent (2008) biography, Douglas Haig and the First World War.

Glyn Harper worries that much of the Great War, and New Zealand's part in it, is being forgotten, and only partly because Gallipoli overshadows everything else: "It is a tragedy that the events of Passchendaele are largely unknown to the majority of New Zealanders (p138)...Though the struggle to capture the town of Bapaume is a relatively unknown battle in New Zealand's military history, it does not deserve this obscurity. It was one of the most costly and hard-fought battles undertaken by the New Zealand Division on the Western Front (p490)". In these days of 'peace studies' and content-lite curricula, he's probably right. But with so many good books now available, at least there's ample opportunity for people to give themselves the education they should have received in school.

On a lighter note, the great Robert B Parker, who died in 2010, set the gold standard for the modern American private eye story with his long-running Boston-centred Spenser series, with its classic themes of honour, manhood, loyalty, courage, and resistance to being pushed around. Dip in anywhere if you've never tried them: they're all good. The franchise has carried on, initially I think because there were unfinished books in the hopper and more recently because some experienced writers have been able to turn the handle on the formula. I just finished one of these recent ones, Ace Atkins' Robert B Parker's Kickback, about the evil connections between a lock-'em-up judge and a privatised prison operator. Excellent, and indistinguishable from the original.

Peter Corris is fortunately still with us, with his Sydney-based Aussie private eye, Cliff Hardy. The latest in this wonderful atmospheric series is That Empty Feeling, a flashback to corporate shenanigans in the Sydney of the 1980s. And if you liked that, you'll also like Philip Temple's Jack Irish series, set in Melbourne, and probably the non-Irish books Temple has written, too.

Thursday, 22 September 2016

Leave well enough alone

No surprises from the Reserve Bank in this morning's review of the Official Cash Rate - it was held at 2.0%, as widely expected (in this survey, for example).

It's been steady as she goes over the ditch, too, not just in the sense that the Reserve Bank of Australia also stood pat at its latest decision, and left the Aussie equivalent at 1.5%, but also in the sense that, earlier this week, the Aussies re-committed to their inflation targetting regime, which is broadly similar to ours. They're not identical - the Aussie target is "keep consumer price inflation between 2 and 3 per cent, on average, over time" and ours is "keep future CPI inflation outcomes between 1 per cent and 3 per cent on average over the medium term, with a focus on keeping future average inflation near the 2 per cent target midpoint", for example - but they're clearly close cousins. The occasion for the Aussies staying with what they've got, by the way, was the change at the helm of the RBA, with incoming governor Philip Lowe taking over from the outgoing Glenn Stevens.

It would be nice to think that our local politicians will see the Aussies signing on for more of the same and draw the right conclusion - inflation targetting is still the mainstream serviceable model for monetary policy - but of course they won't. As sure as eggs is eggs, come to election time we'll have some of the political parties (and on past form, nearly all of them) promising to 'do' something about our monetary policy regime.

It's not an entirely discreditable exercise: some folks are beginning to wonder if there mightn't be something better. The Economist, for example, ran an editorial piece in its August 24 edition, 'When 2% is not enough: The rich world’s central banks need a new target', canvassing two ideas: raising the current target (typically 2% or so in many developed economies) to 4%, or moving on from inflation targetting to targetting of nominal GDP. The Economist argued that "A 2% inflation target is ill-suited to the rich world today. Doubling it would be an improvement, but targeting nominal GDP would be better still. Time for a new era".

It wasn't the most convincing thing the Economist has ever run. It argued, for example, that "credibly enacted", a 4% inflation target could be a goer, but "credibly enacted" magicks away the whole of today's biggest challenge: if central banks can't hit 2% today, despite throwing unprecedented firepower at it, what makes anyone think they can hit 4% tomorrow? Putting that aside, however, it's nonetheless plausible that there are at least some potential candidates for the Next Big Thing in monetary policy.

But as the magazine also said, "Changing targets is not something policymakers should do lightly; their credibility depends on stability". Exactly right: our current system may not be perfect, and as everyone knows we and other countries have been struggling to get inflation to where it should be, but unless there's a very clear benefit to change, net of the considerable credibility costs involved, we ought to do what the Aussies have just done, and stick with the programme.

Not that I expect this unasked-for advice will make a blind bit of difference to the next sets of election manifestos, but as I said last time I looked at some research on these issues,
...my plea to the pollies is this.
Back off. We've got a working system that's done what it said on the label. It takes forever for new monetary systems to get bedded in and for people to get their heads around them: a central bank's credibility takes decades to lock down. We've got there: let's stay there.

Tuesday, 20 September 2016

And now for something completely different...

...namely Ann Pettifor presenting at last night's Law and Economics Association of New Zealand (LEANZ) meeting in Auckland, on the topic, 'Money and the neglected genius: John Law 1671-1729'.

And different it certainly was: the title didn't give much away, but what she aimed to do was to argue that what everyone conventionally learns about money and credit in the economics textbooks is wrong, and that there is a different and better way of understanding what is going on.

The traditional view, she said, has several components. One is that money is secondary: the things that matter are the 'real' things like production and consumption, and money is a lubricant but of no other great importance. Another is the traditional way we think about banks as financial intermediaries that take in people's savings (as deposits) and lend them out (as bank loans) to people who'd like to make use of them. And another is the view that there is a market which matches the supply of money or credit with the demand for it, with the price of money (the interest rate) set in the usual way to match the supply up with the demand.

Instead, she said, money and credit are far more important than conventionally realised: she mentioned, for example, the obstacles to economic activity in developing economies from the lack of a properly functioning monetary system. She said that banks do not need, in fact, to wait till deposits roll in: MegaBank, for example, can unilaterally make two computer entries on its book, one crediting a squillion dollars to MegaCorp's bank account, the other recording a squillion dollar loan to MegaCorp, and immediately the money supply and the stock of credit will go up by a squillion dollars. And she argued (I think) that the interest rate is set autonomously by various human agencies (particularly central banks and commercial banks) and is not the end result of supply and demand matching up.

From a policy point of view she argued that we used to manage banking regulation and monetary policy better, pointing to a period from 1945 through 1971 when there were no financial crises: things have gone worse, she felt, since deregulation. She also argued that the banks, left to their own devices, overwhelmingly lent to relatively easy-to-assess activities like property (creating bubbles in the process) rather than to more productive activities that would have been better for economic growth. And since, on her view, credit is more or less infinitely creatable by central and commercial banks, and in the case of central banks is backed by governments' effectively bottomless ability to tax, we should have little truck with 'austerity' policies. She noted, for example, that we can create money up the wazoo when we want to fund wars or bail out banks, but don't seem to be able to apply the same logic to getting economies rolling or saving the planet's climate, a view that the UK Labour Party has also come to with its proposal for "People's Quantitative Easing".

It's not every day you get someone having a go at knocking over everything you've ever learnt, so full marks to AUT's Policy Observatory, who have brought Ann down to New Zealand and have arranged a wide range of meetings for her: it's good to get challenging, and even iconoclastic, points of view. And special thanks too to Sarah Keene and the team at Russell McVeagh who generously hosted last night's event, and to Richard Meade who does all the legwork to make these Auckland LEANZ events a goer.

Did I get my own mind adjusted? Hmmm. I can see some of her points, but I'm still left with quite a few questions. I'm still not overly inclined to the view that we can print-money our way out of anything: the other week I went into a stamp and coin dealer in Wellington and bought a ten trillion Zimbabwe dollar note for $14, so clearly there are finite limits to what you can do. Ditto running up vast quantities of government debt which (Ann seemed to me to argue) must always be serviceable due to the government's ability to tax. There certainly used to be a view that countries could never go bankrupt (at least when issuing debt in their own currency), but maybe that's also a conventional wisdom that needs challenging. And while John Law may well have been a neglected genius, his experiment of creating one of the earlier paper-money banks and letting rip with it didn't end happily for anyone.

Food for thought all round, and maybe time for a bit of reading, too. Chatting to Ann before the kick-off, she told me that the definitive biography of John Law was written by my lecturer in undergraduate monetary economics at Trinity College Dublin. Law had an extraordinary dramatic life and was a pioneer of early economic theory (Ann principally mentioned his Money and Trade Consider'd with a Proposal for Supplying the Nation with Money of 1705), so I reckon it's time to track down a  copy of Antoin Murphy's John Law: Economic Theorist and Policy-Maker (Oxford University Press, 1997).

Monday, 19 September 2016

What's behind the slide in optimism?

The latest quarterly Westpac McDermott Miller survey of consumer confidence came out this morning, and much of it was pretty positive. But there was one chart in particular that I was keen to see, and it was that mysteriously saggy 'outlook in five years' time' one that's been puzzling me for a while. Here's the latest reading.


The odd thing is that, after a surge of relief  in late 2009 and early 2010 that the worst of the GFC had passed by, people in New Zealand have steadily turned less optimistic about New Zealand's future prospects, despite our recent strong business cycle.

And it's not an oddity of the Westpac McDermott Miller survey: exactly the same pattern shows up in the ANZ Roy Morgan consumer confidence survey.


So why this steady loss of optimism?

That latest bounce in the Westpac reading (and the smaller lift in the latest ANZ one) suggest part of what's going on: it looks as if both measures are picking up the recent improvement in dairy prices. As Westpac commented, "Despite picking up, the number of households expecting favourable economic conditions in five years’ time remains at some of the lowest levels we’ve seen in decades, with those in rural areas especially downbeat...Recently, we’ve seen global prices for dairy starting to
improve, and we’ll be watching to see if confidence in rural regions also starts to lift over the coming months".

International trading conditions are clearly one of the drivers of these measures: they can also be seen in that dip in the ANZ survey readings in mid 2015, which coincided with volatility in world financial markets when it seemed the global economy might be running out of oomph (people at the time were worried about China in particular). Evidently the people surveyed think that (some recent improvement in dairy prices excepted) the world economic outlook is not crash hot at the moment, which looks to be a realistic assessment: every recent major review of the world economy has found it is growing more slowly than usual - as shown for example in this indicator of the world economy from J P Morgan/Markit - and that the balance of risks is tilted to the downside.

There are also probably a couple of other things feeding into the downbeat mood. One is expensive house prices. As the ANZ commented, "Higher house prices aren’t a win for all. Confidence in the 25-34 year bracket (first home buyer heartland) continues to see-saw: as house price expectations rise, their confidence in current conditions falls and vice versa", and I wouldn't be the least bit surprised if very expensive housing isn't feeding into lower longer-term confidence as well.

I wondered if politics also had something to do with it, but neither the ANZ nor the Westpac surveys have questions obviously linked to political perceptions. So I turned to the separate Roy Morgan research which asks people, "Generally speaking, do you feel that things in NZ are heading in the right direction or would you say things are seriously heading in the wrong direction?".


There's a rough and ready fit: in the ANZ, Westpac and Roy Morgan graphs, there's been a rise over 2012-14 and slide over the past couple of years. People are still, on balance, happy with where the country is being taken, but not as happy as they were. What this says I'm not sure: perhaps people feel that somewhere over the next couple of elections, a safe pair of hands will be replaced by something less predictable? Or are they becoming progressively disenchanted with steady as you go and don't frighten the horses?

In sum, that slide in optimism, which seems at odds with the current strong state of the business cycle, can, I reckon, be unpicked - a realistically downbeat assessment of the world economy, a close concern with trends in commodity prices, angst over the dream of home ownership, and, for one still unclear reason or another, some modest loss of confidence in political direction.

Monday, 12 September 2016

Unions and collective agreements

Our revamped Household Labour Force Survey now collects information on union membership and on types of employment agreement, which sounded interesting, but when I went and downloaded the HLFS Excel files (here) the info wasn't there. So I got in touch with Stats and their helpful chap Ken Joe told me two things.

One was that Stats had put out a specific article about these very topics on August 25 (which for some reason I'd missed, and I may not be alone, as there doesn't seem to have been much media coverage of it). And the other was that the data is available, though not where I went searching for it first. If you'd like to look it up for yourself, it's on Infoshare: go to 'Work, income and spending', then 'Household Labour Force Survey' and scroll down to the P's where you'll find 'Paid employees by type of employment agreement' and 'Paid employees by union membership'.

The article said that "Statistics NZ collected this information only twice previously, in the Survey of Working Life 2008 and 2012": they didn't compare the new HLFS data for June 2016 with the previous years' estimates, however, so I've dug out the earlier data. If you missed the Stats release (like I did), and would like the wider historical sweep (such as it is), here is the result.


It's not a pretty picture if you're sympathetic to organised labour. The absolute numbers probably show it even more clearly: in 2008, an estimated 525,000 people were members of a union; by 2012, that had dropped a bit, to 501,000; but it's slumped in the past four years, to 379,000. The drop in numbers of people on collective contracts isn't as dramatic (467,000 to 440,000 to 410,000) but it's still substantial. If the declines continue at these rates in coming years, unions face an existential threat.

Especially if anything arises to weaken membership in the sectors where they are still important. As Stats said, "Some industries are far more unionised than others (see figure 2). Over 4 in 10 employees in both health care and social assistance (43.5 percent) and education and training (42.2 percent) belonged to a union. Given the size of these industries (231,100 and 203,500, respectively), this means half (49.2 percent) of the 379,300 union members worked in only two industries".

Here's that figure 2 Stats was talking about.


Outside what are largely public sector industries, union membership has fallen to insignificant levels - even in sectors such as finance, where unions were once a reasonably large player, but are now down to 10% of the workforce in the sector.

Originally I'd set out to look up some data releases I'd unaccountably missed (I'm on Stats' distribution lists for pretty much everything they put out), and not to do any policy research into the role of unions in a modern economy, and I'm not going to start now. All I'd observe is that the sharp membership fall of the past few years is a lot faster than I intuitively (econospeak for "at a total guess") would have expected to see, and I'd guess there are some worried people around the tables in unions' head offices.

Friday, 9 September 2016

The net benefit test

In some recent posts ('Your competition law exam question' and 'That competition law question') I've been asking if there is something amiss with how the Commerce Commission applies the 'net benefit test' when (for example) authorising a merger that has some anti-competitive detriments, which are more than offset by assorted benefits.

Recently the Commission put up on its website the key case on this, Godfrey Hirst NZ Limited v The Commerce Commission HC WN CIV 2011-485-1257 ('Godfrey Hirst'). Now that I've read it, I'm pretty sure the current Commerce Commission approach is indeed awry.

First some background. Here is a little schematic of all the possible benefits and detriments that might flow from a merger (or anything else with a mix of anti-competitive harm and offsetting public benefits). It is completely general and uncontroversial, and I've added in that 'net of realisation costs' bit to the 'Benefits' boxes, as again it is uncontroversial that any benefits must be counted net of the costs to achieve them (if the realisation costs were equal or greater than the benefits, there wouldn't be a benefit, would there?).


The Commission's approach is to count all benefits anywhere (i.e. A + C), but to count only detriments in the markets where competition is lessened (B), so its calculation of overall net benefit is A + C - B: all the benefits anywhere, less only some of the detriments, though in fairness the bulk of the detriments in practice are likely to arise in box B, and D may not often be large.

Even so, my contention is that this makes no logical or economic sense from a national welfare point of view: why should the detriments D caused by the merger be magicked away and ignored? The correct calculation is surely A + C - B - D: all benefits anywhere, less all detriments anywhere.

The only reasons in principle you'd go the illogical calculation route are if, despite its oddity, you believed the law required it, or courts had interpreted the law to require it (as an empirical issue, you might also feel D detriments are typically too rare or small to bother with, but let's stick to the principles for the moment). As it happens, both reasons have come into play: the approach appears to have started because that's how the Commission (in a 1987 Goodman Fielder decision) interpreted the law as it read at the time, but more recently the courts have also weighed in.

Fast forward to 2011 and Godfrey Hirst. In that High Court case, Godfrey Hirst challenged the Commission's decision to authorise a merger in the wool scouring industry. If you want to skip to the chase, my conclusion is that Godfrey Hirst endorses all-benefits-all-detriments, i.e. A + C - B - D. In its wording the court phrased it as A + (C - D) - B, which is the same thing. In the next bit I'll step through the relevant parts of Godfrey Hirst.

Wool Equities, a cooperative that supported Godfrey Hirst in the appeal, argued for the all-benefits-all-detriments approach, because it thought there were detriments to farmers in markets other than the wool scouring market. There was a bit of argy-bargy at [63] - [65] over whether the Commission had itself (accidentally) endorsed all-benefits-all-detriments, but the court found it hadn't. The court also said that a statement by the judge in the NZ Bus case endorsing the all-benefits-some-detriments approach was only a throwaway line and not settled law.

And so the court - two sharp cookies, Justice Mallon, and Kerrin Vautier sitting as lay member - came to the substance of Wool Equities' argument.

At [67] and [68] they recap that the Commission's current approach started with the Goodman Fielder decision in 1987, though even then, apparently, the Commission wondered about the oddness of it all: at [68] they note that "The Commission asked itself ―[i]f the benefit from the whole of the proposal is taken into account then why not the detriment arising therefrom?".

[69] through [71] are irrelevant for today's purposes, and then at [72] they say the Commission has consistently followed its current approach and that the approach was okayed in two cases involving Telecom in 1992.

And then at [73] we get this (footnotes omitted, and the 'emphasis added' is the court's, not mine):
[73] An acquisition may however result in detriments (other than competition detriments) beyond those markets in which an increase in market power has been found. As to such detriments, the High Court in Telecom said this:
Moreover, we would caution that the detriments attributable to the strengthening of dominance are not the only detriments that could conceivably be relevant. The very concept of benefit to the public allows for some netting out, in an appropriate case, of any detriments to the public from the acquisition itself — albeit, again, it is a question of what difference is made to the shape of the future with and without the acquisition. (emphasis added)
This makes it very clear (to me at least) that any detriments are indeed in play. Which leads us to [74], the key paragraph, and I'm afraid I'm going to have to unpack it in bite-sized chunks.

Chunk 1 : "[74] It is well accepted that, in assessing public benefits, a net approach is taken whereby the costs in realising the efficiencies are deducted. This point was expressly noted by the Commission in this case." All good, and covered in the wee schematic at the head of this post.

Chunk 2: "The above passage [i.e. the High Court Telecom bit] refers to a wider concept of net benefit to the public than that". Indeed it does: it clearly means, don't forget about those detriments in box D.

Chunk 3: "We are not aware of any New Zealand decision, after these comments by the High Court in Telecom, which has viewed net benefit in this wider way". This could mean several things. It could simply mean the point has simply never come up in the period between the Telecom cases (1992) and Godfrey Hirst (2011). It could mean that the opportunity for courts to take the all-benefits-all-detriments approach did come up, but nobody took it. Either way it still leaves the all-benefits-all detriments approach alive. And it also means the Telecom case is the up-to-date statement of the law on the matter.

Chunk 4: "That is, where there are other detriments that fall outside the defined markets [i.e. the ones where competition has been lessened], these can be considered as disbenefits or negative benefits and then offset (along with the costs of realizing efficiencies) against the (positive) public benefits claimed". This probably means, calculate C - D. It might mean calculate A + C - D, but in any event on either reading it says, take note of D.

Chunk 5: "The assessed detriments from the loss of competition in the defined markets would then be weighed against the net public benefit (ie deducting negative benefits as well as realisation costs) from the proposed acquisition to give the overall result". This says, weigh B against A plus the (C - D) calculated from Chunk 4, which means calculate A + (C - D) minus B. Which is of course the same as A + C - B - D, which is all-benefits-all-detriments.

And than at [75] there's this: "Although counsel for Wool Equities did not accept that this was the analytical approach by which detriments outside the defined markets could be taken into account, it would meet the point he was making". This nails it. The court said, Wool Equities were arguing for A + C (all benefits) minus B and minus D (all detriments), but the court's preferred formulation was A + (C - D) (all benefits, but netting off the D detriments against the C benefits in the same way you would net off realisation costs), minus B (detriments in the defined markets). But the outcome is exactly the same.

To recap, counting all benefits and all detriments is obviously the right approach from any commonsensical view. It is also, at a minimum from Godfrey Hirst, permissible. And if it's permissible (and, perhaps, either advisable or even required), why would you stick with the non-commonsensical approach?

So let's go back to the Commission's Authorisation Guidelines, which say in a footnote
32. Godfrey Hirst, above n 11, at [72]. Observation by Wilson J in New Zealand Bus Ltd v Commerce Commission [2008] 3 NZLR 433 (CA) at [271]. In Godfrey Hirst while the court endorsed this settled approach, it observed that ‘disbenefits’ or negative benefits that arise outside the affected markets may be relevant to the public benefit test.
First of all, that observation by Wilson J doesn't matter, as Godfrey Hirst said. And it's debatable, as you've just seen, whether Godfrey Hirst "endorsed this settled approach" (i.e. all-benefits-some-detriments). It's possible that Godfrey Hirst said it's not wrong, but it's also clear that Godfrey Hirst said, all-benefits-all-detriments is, at a minimum, okay and perhaps even required under the Telecom ruling.

All this may seem technical and picky, and maybe nothing will ever turn on it. In practice, though, every imaginable set of business circumstances sooner or later comes in the Commission's window, and it's possible a merger or a restrictive trade practice will indeed involve a sizeable D, a detriment to the community that is being ignored. If the courts have said you can safely take a better, more logical route, why wouldn't you?

Wednesday, 7 September 2016

The Aussies are moving ahead. Meanwhile, in New Zealand....

On Monday the Aussie Treasury came out with the draft legislation to reform their equivalent of our Commerce Act. The announcement is here, and includes the draft legislation itself (pdf) and an explanatory paper (pdf). The Aussies plan to finish consulting on the draft at the end of this month.

The big item is the change to the treatment of misuse of market power. Both Australia and New Zealand currently have very similar laws (our s36, their s46): as the Aussies put it in the explanatory paper (p35), the current approach is that
Section 46 prohibits a corporation with a substantial degree of power in a market from taking advantage of that power in any market for one of three specific purposes. These purposes focus on damaging an actual or potential competitor
where I've italicised three elements we currently share, and the Aussies are changing (p38) to
The rewritten section 46 prohibits a corporation that has a substantial degree of power in a market from engaging in conduct with the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition in a market.
Their italics this time, showing that 'take advantage' has gone, it's no longer 'purpose' alone but 'purpose or effect or likely effect', and it's competition they're concerned about, rather than damage to a particular competitor. They've also added a provision allowing for authorisation of a practice where there is damage to competition, but the company involved can show there are other benefits to the public that make it worthwhile to allow it.

While they're at it, the Aussies have also done some other useful tidying up.

They've made it easier for companies to engage in retail price maintenance: as the paper says (p45), "In recent years, more support has been expressed for the view that RPM is not always anti-competitive...In particular, a number of online business models now use distribution arrangements that may constitute RPM conduct. These businesses are an increasingly significant part of the economy, and provide benefits in many ways".

They've made it less likely that benign cartel provisions as part of a joint venture will fall foul of competition law by widening the exemptions for joint ventures - "The joint venture exception applies to cartel provisions that are for the purposes of a joint venture or reasonably necessary for undertaking a joint venture" (p11) - which is language lifted from our own proposed legislation on cartels. Annoyingly, the Aussies are getting on with progressing our idea, whereas our own proposed legislation on cartels has been stalled since 2014 in a Select Committee.

And they've got rid of a bit of populist nonsense. Currently, only the Aussie banks (the Aussies have a thing about banks) are covered by 'price signalling' provisions - the concern being that one bank announcing to all and sundry that it is changing (say) its mortgage rates will be taken as a nudge, nudge, wink, wink signal to its mates to change theirs too. It's daft - why just the banks? and how on earth are price changes going to be communicated in the normal commercial course of events? - so the Aussies have binned the thing and replaced it with an economy-wide provision on "concerted practices", which will catch any real you-show-me-yours-and-I'll change-mine rorts but let everyday business life carry on.

Good on them. They've ended up with proposed legislation that will catch real misbehaviour more effectively, and at the same time will have less chance of accidentally pinging legitimate business activity. As the paper says, time has moved on since the last time they had a big look at competition policy (in 1993); they've had the major Harper Review in 2014-15; they've gone with most of the Harper recommendations (pdf); and now they're legislating. I don't know enough about the party politics in Australia to take a punt on the legislation's chances, but you can't fault the process thus far.

By comparison, we're faffing around and losing ground, and our dithering has been obvious for some time. Eighteen month ago I asked, 'Australia's got the competition gospel. Have we?', and six months ago I argued that 'The Aussies are winning the competition policy game'.

We haven't had any major review of competition policy, even though we've faced exactly the same changes over the years (such as the rise of online commerce) that the Aussies have. Instead we've had two piecemeal ideas.

One is the Commerce (Cartels and Other Matters) Amendment Bill. As noted earlier, it's stuck. It had its first reading back in July 2012, and its second reading back in November 2014; there's currently no indication when, if ever, it will get moving again.

What modest moves the Bill had in mind are also being chipped away. One of the proposed measures (criminalisation of cartels, as in Australia since 2009) has been dropped. And other bits may go, too. My spies tell me, for example, that the shipping companies are making a very good fist of lobbying for ongoing exemption from the Commerce Act, even though the Commerce Committee in its May 2013 report on the Bill had said, completely correctly, "We do not believe there is good reason for treating international shipping differently from other sectors regulated by the Commerce Act" (p7).

The other is MBIE's targeted review of the Commerce Act, which has been directed to examine only three topics (misuse of market power, market studies, cease and desist orders). It's been a good though distinctly limited process, but we have yet to see the outcome, and even then there's no guarantee that it will lead to reform or modernisation.

In sum, the Aussies have recognised that they needed "to identify impediments across the economy that restrict competition and reduce productivity, which are not in the broader public interest", so that "Australia continues to experience long-term productivity growth".

We haven't.

Tuesday, 6 September 2016

Hard core unemployment

The latest set of Treasury's Monthly Economic Indicators came out yesterday. The media reported on the headline news - the economy picked up in June and carried on in good nick in September - and I was tempted to leave it at that, but there's often something quite interesting in the Indicators that flies below the radar (particularly in the accompanying Chart Pack) so I had a fossick.

Have a look at this.


From which we learn three things.

One is that, as cyclical indicators, the 'underemployment' rate and the 'unemployment' rate tell almost exactly the same story and it doesn't really matter which one you focus on. For some policy purposes the broader 'underemployment' rate, which emerged from the recent revamp of the Household Labour Force Survey and which, as Treasury says "includes people who are unemployed, underemployed and who would like a job but are not actively looking or immediately available for work", is probably the better pick. But as indicators of the cyclical state of the labour market, they're well nigh identical.

The second thing that emerges, with hindsight, is the immense and long-lasting damage the GFC-related recessions here and overseas wrought. Even after six years of recovery we're still well shy of getting back to the labour market outcomes we had pre-GFC.

And the third thing follows from the second: there is still a wide 'output gap' of spare labour market capacity. On a totally instinctive eyeball-the-graph basis, I'd guess that a roughly full-capacity economy would be running an unemployment rate of around 4% (going down to under 3½% near cyclical peaks). Our current unemployment rate (5.1%)  is well above that. And in turn this helps explain why the Reserve Bank has been having such difficulty in getting inflation back up to 2.0%: that's not going to happen unless our domestic spare capacity gets used up a lot more than it has to date.

But there's also one graph in the Chart Pack that makes you wonder about some of this apparently spare capacity.


It's a bit surprising, if there's this supposed slack in the labour market, that employers are reporting that it's getting difficult even to find unskilled employees, and even more difficult again to find skilled employees. Even well-meaning initiatives like the New Zealand Seasonal Workers scheme, which aims to get people off unemployment and at least into temporary work, aren't helping out, as this report from Radio New Zealand showed ("We had 1400 people be interviewed and we struggled to fill an eight-seater bus").

What I see in these graphs, taken together, is that the best we can manage, when times have been good for a while and anyone with a pulse should be able to get a job, is that we would still be left with an unemployment rate of around 4% (and a bit lower again in real boom time conditions). But even allowing for the fact that we'll always have a bit of transitional unemployment, that would still leave a couple of percent of the labour force high and dry in all economic weathers.

We - well, I - don't know exactly why there is this irreducible rump, and it's only restating the issue to say there's a mismatch between what employers are looking for and what would-be employees have (or want) to offer, which might be down to anything. The education system would be near the top of my list, but you'd also wonder about technological change, family background, discrimination, and [insert your own hobbyhorse here]. And perhaps we should be grateful that it's only a couple of percent of the workforce. That's a good deal better than some economies can manage: good luck if you're young and not well-connected in large swathes of western Europe

But it's still an issue worth unpicking and working harder at. There's something going wrong at one end of our workforce when the underemployment rate is still in double digits but employers can't get bums on seats.